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NOTE
POTENTIAL HAVENS FROM
AMERICAN JURISDICTION
AND DISCOVERY LAWS
IN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
INTRODUCTION

Application and enforcement of domestic' antitrust laws potentially affects
individuals and corporations world-wide. Antitrust laws of the United States,
Canada and Great Britain rest upon the fundamental belief that competition
is beneficial.2 Although all three countries purport to discourage monopolies
and other impediments to competition, conflicts arise in the practical application of competition laws to foreign individuals and corporations.3 The United
States' rigorous enforcement policy has recently been the subject of foreign
criticism. 4 The practice of extending domestic jurisdiction to the fullest extent
possible5 has been interpreted by foreign nations and nationals" as an improper
attempt to impose American economic philosophy.7
Substantive domestic antitrust laws have sought to encourage free competition by limiting the concentration of power in trusts and monopolies.8 Competition is considered essential to the support of the free enterprise system. o
Accordingly, Congress enacted the Sherman 0 and Clayton" Antitrust Acts,
1. The term "domestic" will refer to the United States unless otherwise specified.
2. See Blair, The Canadian Experience, A.B.A. SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PERsPEcTIVES ON

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL

APPLICATION

OF U.S.

ANTITRUST AND

OTHER

LAWS 65

(J. P.

Griffin ed. 1979); Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the
United States: A View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 195 (1978); Rubin, Commentary: United States of America, COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A.,
U.S.A. C-II at 13 (1979).

in

3.
4.

See notes 126-185 and accompanying text, infra.
See notes 129, 171-178 and accompanying text, infra.

5.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7, reprinted

A.B.A.

6.
7.

SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL

U.S.

APPLICA-

(J.P. Griffin ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
See text accompanying notes 173-175 infra.
See text accompanying notes 124-125, 130, 175, 178, 185 infra.
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52, 59-62 (1910). See also Note,

TION OF

ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS

8.
Denial of Standing to Private, Noncommercial Consumers Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1531, 1533-34 (1978), Comment, Advancing Consumer Standing
Under Section 4 of The Clayton Act, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 334, 335 (1980).
9.

See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610

(1972); United States v.

First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968).
10. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§1-7
(1976)). The basic provisions of the Sherman Act, §§I & 2, are drafted in broad terms nearing
constitutional scope. 15 U.S.C. §§1 & 2 (1976). Section 1 prohibits all conspiracies, contracts
or combinations in restraint of trade. Section 2 of the Act encompasses monopolization as
well as all attempts to monopolize all or any part of commerce.

11.

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1976); 29 U.S.C. §52 (1976). The Clayton Act is a

set of restrictions ancillary to the Sherman Act, primarily designed to break up business
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which prohibit most anticompetitive activities. The United States commitment to vigorous competition law enforcement is illustrated by its antitrust
treble damage remedy and liberal discovery practices. Through the treble
damage remedy, 2 dvil litigants may recover compensatory damages, as well
as extra damages totalling twice that amount. The latter damages are punitive
in nature, and serve to deter future antitrust violations.13 In addition, the
scope of available discovery in the United States, Canada and Great Britain
differs significantly. 4 The United States allows extensive trial and pre-trial
discovery, 5 while Canada and Great Britain have much more restrained
procedures, particularly in the pre-trial phase. 6
-As each nation's laws are designed to protect its people,1 7 intrinsic
arrangements, such as mergers, which are potentially violative of the Sherman Act. 15 US.C.
§8 (1976). Section 4, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976), and §16, 15 U.S.C. §26 (1976), provide remedies
for private actions brought under any of the antitrust laws. Section 4 supplies a treble
damage remedy for injuries to one's business or property. Section 4 provides: "Any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district
in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount
in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including reasonable attorney's fees." Injunctive relief against any threatened damage
is afforded to private plaintiffs by §16 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §26 (1976).
In addition to these fundamental laws there are various supplemental antitrust statutes.
E.g., The Wilson Tariff Act, 15 US.C. §§8-11 (1976). This act prohibits the importation
of any good from a foreign country, or a conspiracy, combination or contract to import, if
the intended effect is to restrain trade or competition or to increase the market price in the
United States. 15 US.C. §8 (1976). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§45 (1976), empowers the Commission to prevent persons (excluding banks) "from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce." Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerine Act, 15 U.S.C. §64
(1976), extends the Federal Trade Commission Act "to unfair methods of competition used
in export trade against competitors engaged in export trade, even though the acts constituting
such unfair methods are done without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
Section 4A of the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. App. §2403a (Supp. 1977),
provides various rules designed to implement the declared domestic policies of opposition to
foreign boycotts and restrictive trade practices against countries friendly to the United States
or a United States person. It also encourages and sometimes requires domestic exporters (including exporters of information) to refrain from actions which will have the effect of
supporting such boycotts.
12. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976).
18. See Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 808, 314 (1978); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 892 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
14. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (information discoverable even if inadmissible at
trial if it may reasonably lead to admissible evidence) with Radio Corp. of America v.
Rauland Corp. [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 645 ("testimony for the trial itself") and In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 285-88 (1977) (evidence for trial
purposes only).
15. See notes 28-24 and accompanying text, infra.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. See Shenfield, Perspective of the U.S. Department of Justice, A.B.A. SECroN oF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, THE PEsPEOTIVFS ON THE ExTRATERRoaIAL APPLcATION OF US. A.r-

TRUsT AND OMER LAws 13 (J.P.

Griffin ed. 1979).
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differences have developed between antitrust laws and policies in the United
States, Canada and Great Britain. These differences can place multinational
enterprises in precarious positions."' For example, a multinational enterprise
composed of corporations in Canada, the United States and other nations
may be unable to determine which country's conflicting antitrust provisions
require compliance. An act performed wholly within Canada, but which has
adverse consequences within the United States, may violate domestic law.' 9 Yet
this same conduct may not only have been legal in Canada, but consonant with
express Canadian public policy. While an injured American individual could
file suit for treble damages, Canadian laws might insulate the potential
defendant from American competition law liability. If the matter is sufficiently
important to either or both nations, a potential international dispute may
arise.'

0

The central question in such an international dispute is whether the foreign
court would recognize and enforce American antitrust laws and discovery procedures. This note will consider factors affecting the resolution of these issues,
as well as related issues raised by recent reprisals of Canada and Great
Britain for alleged American invasions of their sovereignties. The discussion
will also focus on the difficulties encountered in obtaining documents located
abroad for use in domestic civil antitrust proceedings.
UNITED STATES PROCEDURAL LAw

Service in a foreign country is available to private domestic litigants in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 1 Rule 422 determines

the validity of service for federal courts. The scope of available discovery is
delineated in Rule 26(b).3 Generally, discovery is available for unprivileged
matters that are relevant to the subject matter of the action. Information
is discoverable even if it would be inadmissible at trial, as long as it "appears
24
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'
To obtain information from a foreign person not within the court's jurisdiction, a domestic tribunal may transmit letters rogatorys to a foreign court
18. See Stanford, supra note 1, at 204-06.
19. See notes 42-45, 98-102, 111-118 and accompanying text, infra (discussing the effects
doctrine).
20. The textual example refers to the current Westinghouse uranium litigation. See
notes 126-185 and accompanying text, infra.
21. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text, infra.
22. FE. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1). This rule permits foreign service as authorized by federal
and/or state law. Five alternative methods are available. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(1) (A)-(E). See
Bomse, Service of Process; Working With Foreign Counsel 1-5 (unpublished manuscript
furnished by Mahony, Hadlow & Adams, Miami, Florida) (analyzing various methods of
obtaining foreign service).
23. FE. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See notes 129-131, 176 infra (the Canadian and British
views of the broad scope of discovery available in the United States). See also note 14
supra.

25. Letters rogatory are "the medium, in effect, whereby one country, speaking through
one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its own courts and by methods
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or agency. 28 The foreign court must honor the letter and compel disclosure of
requested information2 7 only if it is bound by an international treaty. Otherwise the tribunal is under no obligation to enforce the letter and will do sc
2
only out of regard for notions of international comity.
In addition, foreign governments are immune from domestic process and
suits under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.2 The Act
ostensibly conforms with traditional principles of international law"0 by inof court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the
administration of justice in the former country; such request being made, and being usually
granted, by reason of comity existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times." Tiedemann v. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941). Letters rogatory are merely a
means of request, not binding upon the foreign tribunal.
Although no specific form is required for the letters rogatory, Articles 3 and 4 of the
Hague Convention, Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, [1970] 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention II]
require compliance with language formalities and the inclusion of specified information
including the name and address of requesting authority, nature of proceedings, specific
evidence to be obtained, names and addresses of persons to be examined and a complete
description of documents or other property to be examined. Both the United States and
Great Britain are parties to the Convention and Canada has signed, although not yet
ratified it. To assist in the preparation of requests, a special commission which met at
the Hague to study the Convention, drafted a recommended form for evidential requests.
The United States' representative who served on the special committee has suggested the
use of the form as one which will "greatly facilitate the preparation of requests." Ristau,
The Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad and Declaration Concerning Pretrial
Discovery 8, 13 (1979) (unpublished manuscript supplied by Mahoney, Hadlow and Adams,
Miami, Florida).
26. 28 U.S.C. §1781 (1976) empowers the Department of State, in addition to a domestic
court, to transmit the letter rogatory to a foreign country. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) that
authorizes depositions in a foreign country pursuant to letters rogatory.
27. See Note, Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence (Proceeding In Other Jurisdictions) Act, 11 CoRNx INa' L.J. 828, 823 n.8 (1978).
28. See note 25 supra. A technique available to the Attorney General to compel production of evidence in civil cases involving the United States is the civil investigative demand,
or C.I.D. Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1311-1814 (1976). Prior to the institution of
any proceeding, the Attorney General may issue a C.I.D. requiring disclosure of documentary
evidence. This must be described with "such definiteness and certainty as to permit such
material to be fairly identified." 15 U.S.C. §1812(8)(b)(2)(A) (1976). But see Radio Corp. of
America v. Rauland Corp., [1966] 1 Q.B. 618, 645; Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 452-54 (H.L. 1977); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. &
Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 285-88 (1977) (severe requirements imposed by the
English and Canadian courts). Disclosure, however, will not be compelled by one who claims
a constitutional or other legal privilege including the privilege against self-incrimination.
This latter privilege is unavailable to corporations. 15 U.S.C. §1812(i)(7)(A) (1976).
29. 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (1976). In the context of this note, the term state signifies a
foreign nation. A foreign state as defined by 28 U.S.C. §1608, includes "a political subdivision
of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Agency or instrumentality is further defined as "(1) a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose
shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
and (8) which is . . . [not] created under the laws of any third country." 28 U.S.C.
§1603(b)(1), (2) & (3) (1976).
S0. See Triggs, ExtraterritorialReach of United States Antitrust Legislation: The Inter-
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corporating the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity.' Prior to its
enactment, the State Department, as well as the courts, determined whether
or not immunity would be granted to foreign sovereigns. Foreign governments facing domestic litigation often exerted political pressure on the State
32
Department in an effort to secure sovereign immunity. As a result of this
legislation, however, the judiciary has the final authority to decide whether
to grant immunity in a given case."3

Notably, commercial activity by a foreign sovereign is not immune under
the Act.' 4 The commercial activity need not occur within the United States'
territory; if it has a direct effect in this country, it is actionable."5 Thus it
would appear at first glance that many activities, for example production of
mineral resources by a foreign sovereign, that potentially violate domestic
national Law Implications of the Westinghouse Allegations of a Uranium Producer's Cartel,
12 ME. U. L. REV. 250, 277-79 (1979).
31. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6605, defining sovereign immunity as: "a doctrine of international
law under which domestic courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign
state."
32. Id.
33. See 28 U.S.C. §1602 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7, 12 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6606, 6610. This
practice is said to comport with that of other nations. Moreover, the judiciary is freed from
the practice of deferring to political pressure from the State Department. This is to ensure
that once the decision is reached, it will rest upon legal reasoning, not executive pressure and
interference. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 6604, 6610. The State Department, however, has not been
completely silent. On May 6, 1980, the Associate Attorney General sent a "formal statement
of interest by the United States" to the presiding judge in Westinghouse, Inc. v. Rio Algom,
Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Letter from John H. Shenefield to the Honorable
Prentice H. Marshall (May 6, 1980), reprinted in [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,416.
The letter asks, inter alia, that foreign governments be allowed to directly communicate
their positions to the courts as amici.
Even if the foreign state is denied immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
the act of state doctrine may be asserted to preclude judicial review of the foreign government's act. This doctrine "precludes courts of this country from inquiring into the validity
of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). Whereas sovereign immunity
is a jurisdictional bar, act of state is an issue preclusion device involving choice of law
questions. See National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 639-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). Therefore, the act of state doctrine has no application under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 20 (1976), reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6619 n.l.
34. 28 U.S.C. §1602 (1976) provides: "Under international law, states are not immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned,
and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered
against them in conjunction with their commercial activities." Under the act, whether an
activity is commercial will be determined by examining the nature of the conduct or transaction, not by reference to its purpose. See 28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (1976).
35. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2) (1976). This is apt to cause consternation among our foreign
allies who firmly believe that the United States attempts to overextend its power of jurisdiction. See Stanford, supra note 2, at 197, 199-201; Triggs, supra note 30, at 261, 263-64, 266.
This application of domestic jurisdiction over conduct which affects the United States is
consistently invoked to enforce the antitrust laws. See Shenefield, supra note 17, at 15.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 5
INTERNATIONAL

ANTITRUST

ENFORCEMENT

antitrust laws would not be immune because they are commercial in nature.

6

Partial immunity is granted, however, as the Act provides that foreign states
are not liable for punitive damages.3 7 Private domestic antitrust actions are
generally brought under the treble damage provision of the Clayton Act.s8
Therefore, two-thirds of the damages awarded in the action would be punitive
in nature and not recoverable from the foreign state.3 9
In response to the dearth of litigated antitrust cases dealing with foreign
governments or nationals, the Justice Department has developed the Antitrust
Guide for International Operations. 40 Although it is not law, the Guide is
considered an authoritative statement of the Justice Department's enforcement policy.4 The Guide's jurisdictional approach is very clear: the government's position is to extend jurisdiction as far as legally permissible.42 The
test for defining the scope of jurisdiction is the effects doctrine,43 which extends
jurisdiction to "foreign transactions which have a substantial and foreseeable
effect on U.S. commerce . . . regardless of where they take place."- The
36. The international analysis published in conjunction with the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act included mineral extraction as a commercial activity. See Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1975 [sic]: Section by Section Analysis, 15 INT'L

LEGAL MATERLS

102, 105

(1976).
37. See 28 U.S.C. §1606 (1976). Although foreign states are not liable for punitive damages, §1606 specifically provides that agencies and instrumentalities of the foreign state are
liable for punitive damages. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE 9- AD. NEWS 6604, 6621.
38. See Comment, supra note 8, at 340-41 n.60, 344 n.79.
39. The compensatory or actual damages incurred by the domestic plaintiff would
probably be recoverable. Accord, Silva, Outline for Panel Discussion on Conducting Transnational Litigation 5 (unpublished manuscript supplied by Hahoney, Hadlow &cAdams,
Miami, Florida).
40. See GumE, supranote 5.
41. Id. See Rosenthal, An Overview of the Guide and its Objectives, ABA SECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, PERPECTIVES ON THE ExRATuroIMORL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUsT

LAwS 82-84 (J.P. Griffin ed. 1979).
42. See Guide, supra note 5, at 6-8. The legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (1976), specifies that it is not intended to affect application of the Sherman Act by the use of the terms "direct effect" or "substantial contacts" in
§1603(e). See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
&AD. NEWl 6604, 6618.
43. See Shenefield, supranote 17, at 15.
44. GumE, supra note 5, at 6. The effects doctrine is the approach used by domestic
courts and adopted by the American Law Institute. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
444 (2d Cir. 1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§18 (1965).
The Guide recognizes affirmative defenses to challenge subject matter jurisdiction, such as
the act of state doctrine, see note 33 supra, and the doctrine of international comity, see notes
122, 136-139 infra. The Justice Department, however, has stated its intention to limit their
application because the defenses have been claimed in an overbroad manner. See GUIE, supra
note 5, at 5-6. Moreover, Douglas Rosenthal, Chief of the U.S. Antitrust Division's Foreign
Commerce Section, has stated that: "a conspiracy, even if entered into abroad among
foreigners, is subject to the U.S. antitrust laws if it has the intended and actual effect of
restraining United States domestic or foreign commerce." Remarks of Douglas Rosenthal, then
Ass't Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the
AND OTHER
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Guide also states the Department's intention to extend personal jurisdiction
in accordance with the expansive trend of domestic courts.45 The international
reaction to this jurisdictional policy has been generally one of protest. 46 Re-

cently, several countries have enacted statutes which block United States
47
attempts to expand the reach of its antitrust laws.
COOPERATI ON BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES,
CANADA AND GREAT BRITAIN

In recognition of increasing international trade between countries with
different competition laws, the United States has entered into international
agreements that promise cooperation in the antitrust field. 48 The United
States and Canada have collaborated on common antitrust concerns since
the Fulton-Rogers Agreement of 1959. 41 Modified ten years later by the
Basford-Mitchell Agreement, 0 the nations have bilaterally developed a procedure for notification and consultation about antitrust procedures. 5' Under
the agreements, prior to the institution of a suit and, whenever possible, at
the investigation stage, each country is to notify the other of any prospective
litigation which involves citizens or interests of the other nation. Discussions

World Trade Institute, Antitrust Jurisdiction and the Activities of Foreign Governments 3
(Dep't Just. Press release, Jan. 29, 1976) quoted in Stanford, supra note 2, at 199.
45. See GUIDE, supra note 5, at 8. (citing Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., A.C., 1975-2
Trade Cas. 160,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
46. Several foreign commentators have expressed opposition to the effects doctrine. See,
e~g., Jacobs, ExtraterritorialApplication of Competition Laws: An English View, 13 INT'L
LAW 645, 650-53 (1979); Triggs, supra note 30, at 261. Critics of the effects doctrine have
observed that domestic jurisdiction frequently rests on presumed, not direct and substantial
effects. The theory, also, involves balancing by the courts. Foreign commentators claim that
domestic courts too often find domestic interests outweigh those of other nations. See Jacobs,
supra, at 650-51. For a discussion of other theories of international jurisdiction, see Triggs,
supra note 30, at 253-57.
47. See, e.g., Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement Act of 1979),
AcTs Ausm. P.; Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence Act of 1976), AcTs
Ausm. P.; Restriction of Evidence Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions Act, 1975, c.34 (Eliz.
II); Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0 & R 1977 (Can.). For discussion of a

proposed Canadian blocking statute, bill C-41, see

ANTnTRUST

& TRADE

REG.

REP. (BNA) No.

919, at A-19 to A-20, 979 at A-5 to A-6 (Aug. 28, 1980).
48. See Dep't of Just. Press Release (Nov. 3, 1969), reprinted in [1972] 5 TRADE & REo.
REP. (CCH) 50,112. See also notes 49-81 and accompanying text, infra.
49. See Dep't of Just. Press Release (Nov. 3, 1969), reprinted in [197,2] 5 TRADE & REG.
REp. (CCH) 150,112. This agreement had its basis in discussions between the then Canadian
Minister of Justice, E. D. Fulton, and then Attorney General William Rogers. From this
agreement originated the "Antitrust Notification and Consulation Procedure." Id.
50. Id. This arrangement grew out of a meeting in November of 1969 between then
Canadian Consumer and Corporate Affairs Minister, Ron Basford, and then U.S. Attorney
General, John Mitchell.
51. Since 1958 the United States and Canada have engaged in almost weekly telephone
conversations concerning restrictive business practice issues between the two countries. See
Davidow, Some Reflections on the OECD Competition Guidelines, 22 ANTrsTUrr BULL. 441,
443 (1977).
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under the agreement, however, have no binding effect upon either nation. 52
The consultations are designed to avoid misunderstandings that may arise
when one nation's enforcement activities appear to give extraterritorial effect
to domestic competition laws at the expense of the other's sovereignty. 53
This United States-Canadian agreement was the forerunner of recommendations subsequently developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). Participants in this organization, which include
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, 54 have developed a
voluntary procedure for coordination of restrictive trade practices that affect
international trade. 55 The recommendations emphasize that the proposals are
voluntary and effect neither a country's extraterritorial application of its law
nor its sovereignty. 51 The recommendations provide for notification and consultation between the countries whose competition law interests are affected.
If the nations agree that a member country is adversely affected, the informed
nation ensures that remedial action is taken, either by the enterprise or by
itself. If no settlement is reached, the nation submits the problem to the
Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices for resolution.5r This
procedure for settlement of transnational antitrust disputes has the advantage
of offering the parties a non-judicial forum composed of governmental experts.58
The OECD proposal is considered a significant step towards facilitating cooperation in the field of international antitrust law. 59 The voluntary nature
of the recommendation, however, raises the question as to whether it will be
utilized to its optimum potential.
In April of 1980, the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business
Practices adopted an international antitrust code. 60 Although this code, like
the OECD proposal, is not binding,61 it establishes an international policy

52. See Dep't of Just. Press Release (Nov. 3, 1969), reprinted in [1972] 5 TRADEa & RaG.

EP'. (CCH) 50,112.
53. Id. At least one Canadian official has expressed concern that the recent expansive enforcement policy contemplated in the Antitrust Guide for International Operations may
impair the effectiveness of these arrangements. See Stanford, supra note 2, at 196-97. Moreover, this concern has been expressed in a recent bill introduced in the Canadian Parliament that would block the extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust laws in Canada.
See ANrnxrusr & TRADE Ra. REP. (BNA) No. 979, at A-5 to A-6 (Aug. 28, 1980); 973 at
A-19 to A-20 (July 17, 1980).
54. The OECD's membership includes 19 European countries, Canada, the United
States, Japan, and the Common Market nations. See Dep't of Just. Press Release (Nov. 8,
1969), reprinted in [1972] 5 TRADE & REG. EEP. (CCH) 50,112.
55. Recommendation of the Council (OECD) Concerning A Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, reprinted in
19 ArnTausT BuLL. 283 (1974).
56. Id. at 283-84.
57. Id. at 284-85.
58. See Press Release of OECD (Dec. 20, 1973), reprinted in 19 ANrraxusT BuL. 287, 288

(1974).
59. See Zisler, The Work of -the OECD Committee of Experts On Restrictiuve Business
Practices, 19 ANTTRUST BuLL. 289, 290-91 (1974).
60. See ANmmusr & TRADE RE. REP. (BNA) No. 961, at A-10 to A-11 (Apr. 23, 1980).
61. See International Code Approved by United Nations Conference on Restrictive
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that encourages competition and endeavors to control concentrations of
economic power and capital.62 In addition to recommending conformity with
enumerated substantive competition policies, the code encourages binational
and multinational consultation, cooperation, 63 and exchange of information
on restrictive trade practices. Moreover, transnational enterprises are directed
to provide the authorities of affected countries with all available information
when such disclosure is not precluded by law or public policy. 4 The United
Nations General Assembly is expected to adopt the agreement this fall.65
While it is too soon to judge the potential effect of the recommendation, its
broad language and voluntary nature may diminish its effectiveness in the
international antitrust enforcement arena.
Another multinational effort is the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters (Hague Conventioni I), 6 designed to expedite service of documents
abroad.6 7 To obtain service under the Convention, each country designates
a central authority to receive requests for service. 68 Service through a central
authority accords with service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
(i)(1)(A). The foreign state may not refuse compliance either because it claims
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction or because the action that prompted the
service is impermissible in the receiving country. 9 Only if compliance with
the service request would infringe upon its national security or sovereignty
may the receiving nation refuse to comply. 7° These two grounds for noncompliance provide signatories with considerable leeway for denial. If the
receiving country deems the subject matter significant and the action adverse
to its interest, one of these two broad reasons could be offered to deny service.
For instance, in a suit involving uranium extraction, national security could
be offered as justification for noncompliance.
The second Hague Convention on Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague
Business Practices, preface, reprinted in ANTITRUST
to G-5 (May 8, 1980).
62. Id. §A(2).

& TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) No. 963, at G-1

63. Id. §§D, E(6).
64. Id. §D(2).
65. See ANTITRUST TRADE & REG. REP. (BNA) No. 961, at A-10 (Mar. 5, 1980).

66. [1969] 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention 1]. The Convention
has been ratified by, inter alia, the United States and the United Kingdom. Id.
67. See Hague Convention I, supra note 66, at preamble. The Convention applies "in all
cases, in civil or commercial matters where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad."
68. Id. art. 2. A list of the central authorities may be obtained from the Justice Department and any U.S. Marshall's office. Article 5 of the Hague Convention I designates
three ways to effect service: (1) in accordance with the law of the country where made; (2)
by a method requested by the applicant unless it conflicts with the law of the receiving
nation; (3) any method, if compatible with the receiving nation's law if voluntarily accepted.
Generally, translations into the local language will be required. Moreover, the request must
conform to a specified form which can be found annexed to the codified copy of the Convention.
69. See Hague Convention I, supra note 66, art. 13,
70. Id.
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Convention 11)71 was opened for signature in 1970. The Convention, entitled
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, facilitates
the gathering of evidence for litigants in member countries for "judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated." 72 The Hague Convention II requires
that letters of request be sent to a central authority and comply with certain
formalities.73 There are two major advantages to the treaty. First, by eliminating the need for diplomatic channels it operates as a timesaving device.
Second, it increases the likelihood that evidence will be obtained, because
only in limited circumstances may signatory members avoid their treaty ob-

ligation to produce the information. 74

The Hague Convention II provides that a requested country can refuse
to provide evidence only if under its law the execution of the letter rogatory
is not a judicial function or if it "considers that its sovereignty would be

prejudiced thereby."75 While these two provisions are the exclusive express
grounds for refusing an evidentiary request, Article 23 of the Convention
allows each signatory state to "declare that it will not execute Letters of Request
issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known
in Common Law countries." 071 Thus, the extensive discovery permitted under

71. Hague Convention I, supra note 25.
72. Id. art. 1. Presently the Convention is in force between the United States, the United
Kingdom and eleven other nations. Thirteen other countries, including Canada, are signatories, but have not yet ratified it. See Ristau, supra note 25, at I n.l.
73.

See note 25 supra.

74. See Ristau, supra note 25, at 1. See generally Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures,
13 INT'L LAW 5, 17 (1979).
75. Hague Convention II, supra note 25, at art. 12. Additionally, the Hague Convention
II contains the same provisions as the earlier Convention, note 74, supra, prohibiting noncompliance by member nations because there would be no right of action in the addressed
country, or because it claims exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. Hague Convention II,
supra note 25, at art. 2. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
76. Hague Convention I, supra note 25, art. 28. This provision was included at the
prompting of the United Kingdom. Moreover, every nation, except the United States, that has
ratified the Convention has included this reservation. See G. DRoz, ADDRESS BEFoRE TIE WORKSHOP ON PROBLEMS IN TRAwSNATIONAL LITIGATION, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE AND CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN FACILITATING JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE CO-OPERATION 5 (April 16, 1980) (un-

published address supplied by Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams, Miami, Florida).
The United States representative to a Special Commission that met at the Hague to study
the operation of Evidence Convention, questioned the other delegates as to why the pre-trial
proceedings had been excluded. He recalled: "[T]he Swedish delegate responded it was his
understanding that American law permits attorneys to invoke the aid of the courts to go
on a 'fishing expedition' to determine whether there might be some evidence somewhere
which would support a lawsuit. ...

"The U.K. delegate in turn inveighed against the extraordinary breadth of discovery
sanctioned in this country .. " Ristau, supra note 25, at 9.
The author notes some practical guidelines for attempting to procure foreign discovery

of documents under the Convention. If the phrase "for purposes of pre-trial discovery" is
used, then invariably the requested country will not honor the request. The request should
be as narrow as possible and the documents requested should be specified. Additionally, the

recommended model form for the letter of request should be followed. Id. at 10, 12. See also
note 25 supra.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) 7 7 is limited in those nations which
have enacted this reservation.
To date, every ratifying nation, other than the United States, has adopted
this reservation7 8 One reason is an apparent misunderstanding of the meaning of pre-trial.-0 The delegates interpreted the term pre-trial to include all
discovery prior to the actual trial phase of the action 0 rather than that prior
to the institution of a suit. If this accurately represents foreign opinion, then
the meaning of the Convention may become limited, as if the phrase "for
use in judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated1 excluded the
last two words. This interpretation would effectively prevent domestic litigants
from obtaining foreign documents for use in pre-trial discovery proceedings.
UNITED STATES CASE LAW

The earliest United States Supreme Court case which dealt with the
extraterritorial reach of domestic antitrust laws was American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co.8 2 Although both plaintiff and defendant were United States
corporations, all of the acts constituting the alleged Sherman Act violation
occurred in South America. 3 Prior to the formation of the plaintiff corporation, United Fruit had monopolized commerce and fixed prices in the banana
trade.8 4 After plaintiff had purchased a Panamanian banana plantation, Costa
Rican soldiers, allegedly at. the behest of defendnts, seized a portion of the
land and supplies, halting operation of the plantation and construction of
plaintiff's railway s 5 Defendant then acquired the plantation in a court proceeding that plaintiff alleged was beyond the jurisdictional authority of Costa
Rica. American Banana contended that defendant's acts, which occasioned the
loss of its plantation, supplies and railway, as well as defendant's practice of
driving purchasers out of the banana market, caused plaintiff substantial

77. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text, supra.
78. Carter, supra note 74, at 16. See note 76 supra.
79. Carter, supra note 74, at 16; G. DRoz, supra note 76, at 5; Ristau, supra note 25, at 9
(the views of the United Kingdom).
80. In the French translation of Article 23, the words pre-trial discovery of documents
and Common Law appear in English; thus the likelihood of confusion is increased. Hague
Convention II, supra note 25, at art. 23.
81. Id. art. 1. See text accompanying note 72 supra. The United States representative
to the Special Commission, see note 76 supra, did explain to the other delegates that discovery
is the only stage of the proceedings at which a domestic litigant will be able to request
foreign assistance.
82. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
83. Id. at 354-55.
84. Id. at 354. United Fruit bought out many of its major competitors, securing covenants
not to compete in the banana trade. Other agreements were made regulating the amount and
price of purchases. Finally, defendant organized a company that sold bananas of the combining parties at fixed prices. The Court determined that these activities violated the
Sherman Act.
85. Id. at 354-55. Defendant attempted to persuade plaintiff's predecessor to join the
combination. When he refused, defendant ordered him to cease his operation. Shortly thereafter, the plantation was sold to United Fruit. Id.
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injury.8
In the alternative,87 plaintiff alleged a successful conspiracy to drive
American Banana out of business. s8

The Court denied plaintiff a cause of action, holding that the conduct
complained of was outside the jurisdictional reach of domestic antitrust laws.
Common considerations of statutory construction compelled the Court to
conclude that the antitrust laws had only a territorial application: 9 Speaking
for the Court, Justice Holmes stated: "The general and almost universal rule
is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."90 The Court reasoned

that one nation's application of its law to acts occuring in the territory of
another would be more than unjust; it would contravene notions of inter-

national comity. 91
The territorial view taken by the Court in American Banana gradually
eroded 2 and was eventually replaced with the effects doctrine.93 This jurisdictional test was originated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).94 The court had to determine whether
Limited, a Canadian corporation formed to take over Alcoa's properties outside the United States, had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 9 Limited,
together with Swiss, German, French and British corporations had formed
Alliance, a foreign cartel in the form of a Swiss corporation.9 6 The purpose
of the Alliance cartel was to limit aluminum production, including aluminum
86. Id. at 355.
87. Id. The alternative contention was offered in case the Court held that the defendant
was not liable for acts requiring the Costa Rican government's cooperation.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 357. The Court noted that the word 'law' "commonly is confined . . . to

persons living within the power of the courts.... [r]n a case of doubt ... a construction
of any statute is intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. All legislation is prima facie
territorial." (emphasis in original) Id. at 356-57.

90. Id. at 356.
91. Id.

92. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). The Sisal court

found defendants had successfully monopolized interstate and foreign trade in sisal, (a fiber
produced exclusively in the Yucatan and used to make binder twine). Although most of
the elements of the crime took place in Mexico with the aid of favorable legislation, the
Court determined that some alleged conduct had taken place domestically. Moreover, the
effect of the sisal monopoly raised the import price of sisal in the United States, violating the
Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 349, §73, 28 Stat. 570 (1894) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §8 (1976)),
in addition to the Sherman Act.
93. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text, supra. The doctrine extends the jurisdiction
of domestic antitrust law to conduct that occurs outside United States territory, if the
conduct affects interstate commerce or trade between the United States and foreign nations.
Generally, although intent is required, it will be presumed if the effect is a natural consequence of the act. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
94. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Originally the case had been appealed to the Supreme
Court, however, because the Court lacked a quorum of qualified Justices, it was referred to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
811-12, 812 n.10 (1946).
95. 148 F.2d at 439, 443.
96. Id. at 442.
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imported into the United States, by imposing production quotas on its
members. Fines were assessed if production exceeded the quotasY7
The court had to determine whether Congress in enacting the Sherman
Act intended to impose liability on foreigners and whether it was constitutional
to do so. 98 At the outset the court noted that United States aluminum imports
had been affected by the cartel's activities. 99 Judge Hand concluded: "[Alny
state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities
other states will ordinarily recognize." 100 The court provided specific examples
of situations which would or would not be comprehended by the Act. Agreements made outside the United States which affected imports or exports but
which were not intended to have any effect on them were deemed outside the
scope of the law. Moreover, if the agreements failed to affect the United
States, they were outside the Act's coverage regardless of intent.'1 1 Rather,
the court held that where intent and actual effect upon domestic prices
coalesce in agreements made abroad, the Sherman Act is violated. This co10
alescence was found in Alcoa.

2

97. Id. at 442-43. An earlier agreement between the members of the cartel excluded
imports to the United States.
98. Id. at 443.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 443-44.
102. Id. at 434-35. Cf. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958) (international conflict of discovery laws). Although Societe is not an
antitrust case it is the leading case involving a conflict between the demand of a domestic
court for discovery of document,; and a foreign criminal law prohibiting such production.
In Societe, suit was brought by a Swiss holding company to recover property which had been
seized as enemy owned property under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 415 (as
amended 50 U.S.C. app. §5(b)). 357 U.S. at 198-201. The district court ordered plaintiff to
produce records held by a Swiss bank. Swiss criminal law prohibited disclosure of the information. The records were subsequently seized by the Swiss government. Id. at 200-01.
Plaintiff successfully persuaded the Swiss government to release a substantial portion of the
records, but was unable to fully comply with the district court's order. Despite its finding
that plaintiff had diligently, in good faith, attempted to comply, the action was dismissed
under FED. R. Crv. P. 37. Societe International Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers
243 F.2d 254, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding dismissal unjustified by the facts. Fear
of criminal prosecution under foreign law constituted a sufficient excuse for noncompliance
with the production order. 357 U.S. at 211. The Court determined that, in light of plaintiff's
good faith efforts, his inability to comply had to be considered with the adequacy of his
proof, not the dismissal of his action.
The Court strongly implied that situations could exist where, although illegal under
foreign law, a domestic court could insist upon compliance with its discovery order. Id. at
205-06. See Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent
Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production,
14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 749-51 (1974). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§39(1), 40 (1965). Section 39 of the Restatement permits a
country having jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce a rule of law even if it subjects a person
to engage in conduct that is illegal in the state which has jurisdiction over the conduct.
Section 40 qualifies the application of §39 by imposing limitations on the exercise of
jurisdiction. In accord with the holding of the Supreme Court in Societe Internationale,
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Recently, the Ninth Circuit reevaluated and expanded the elements
considered in foreign antitrust cases in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America. 03 A Sherman Act antitrust suit was brought by three affiliated
corporations, one domestic and two incorporated in Honduras. The main
defendants were a California bank and a Honduran branch of its whollyowned subsidiary.10 4 Timberlane contended that Bank of America had
conspired with several Hondurans to prevent Timberlane's subsidiaries from
importing lumber to the United States. 0 5 Additionally, Timberlane alleged a
direct and substantial effect on domestic commerce. 0 6 The appellate court
reversed the lower court's finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 0 7
The court observed at the outset that domestic antitrust laws do reach
some extraterritorial conduct 08 of aliens and nationals. 0 9 Although the test
§40 provides: "Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct on the part of a person, each
state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of
its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as:
a) vital national interests of each of the states,
b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
d) the nationality of the person, and
e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state."
103. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The Timberlane decision is considered significant both
by domestic courts, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 passim
(3rd Cir. 1979), as well as by the Justice Department. See Shenefield, supra note 17, at 12, 22-25.
104. 549 F.2d at 603. Additional individual defendants were named and served; all were
United States' citizens. Defendants which were named, but not served and did not appear,
included one Canadian citizen, two Honduran corporations, and one Honduran citizen. One
of the unserved Honduran corporations, together with another co-conspirator (a Honduran
individual who was not named as a defendant) were Timberlane's primary competitors and
allegedly the masterminds behind the conspiracy to destroy Timberlane. Id. at 603-04.
105. Id. at 604-05.
106. Id. at 605. The court noted that most of the activity and effect occurred in Honduras.
Id. at 615.
107. Id. at 615. The appellate court was unclear as to the basis of the district court's
dismissal of the action. It concluded, however, that under theories of dismissal for failure to
state a claim, FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(b)(6), lack of subject matter jurisdiction on summary judgment, FED. R. Civ. P. 56, the district court erred in dismissing the suit. See 549 F.2d at 601-03.
108. Id. at 609-10.
109. Id. at 610. The court noted that although the extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust law was settled in the United States, citing United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) and United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp.
753 (D.NJ. 1949), judgment implementing decree, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.NJ. 1953), foreign
nations that had been affected had protested, expressing resentment to the broad application
of American jurisdiction. 549 F.2d at 609, citing A. NE.A, THE ANTrrausr LAws orma
UNrrED STATES OF AMaIucA 365-72 (2d ed. 1970); Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE Crr OF NEw YORK,
OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAws
TO COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONs 7-18 (1957); Zwarensteyn, The Foreign Reach of the
American Antitrust Laws, 3 AN. Bus. L.J. 163, 165-69 (1965). Accord, REPORT or THE 51sr
CONFERENCE OF THE INT'L LAW ASS'N 565-92 (1965).
NATIONAL SEcuRrrY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE APPLICATION
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usually offered to support extraterritorial jurisdiction is effect upon domestic
commerce, the court was critical of this theory."" The degree of effect required
by courts has been inconsistent."' Moreover, commentators advocate differing
standards of requisite intent.112 Finally, the effects test alone fails to take
into account the interests of foreign nations.11
Accordingly, the Timberlane court rejected a pure effects analysis and
developed an analytical framework for determining whether the United States
should assert jurisdiction in a given case. As a preliminary step, the court
identified three elements required by the antitrust laws. First, there must be
some effect on United States' foreign commerce, either actual or intended.
Second, the effect must be significant enough to have produced a cognizable
injury, sufficient to constitute a civil violation of the antitrust laws, to the
plaintiffs. Finally, the court. should balance domestic interests against those
of other nations to determine whether there is sufficient weight to justify
extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws."14
In this tripartite analysis it is the third step that primarily determines
whether jurisdiction should be extended. The court, therefore, set out the
factors to be weighed under the third element:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality
or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principle places of
business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance
of the effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere,
the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, . .. the relative
importance of the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad.11
This analysis has interjected considerations of international comity noticeably
110. 549 F.2d at 610.
111. Id. at 610-11. For differing tests used to ascertain the necessary effect upon United
States' foreign commerce, see United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D.
Cal. 1957); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) ("direct
and substantial"), United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 444 (2d Cir. 1945)
("intend[ing] to affect imports and exports [and] . .. actually . . . [having] some effect on
them"); United States v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949)
("a direct and influencing effect on trade").
112. See, e.g., Rhal, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of American Antitrust Laws, 43
ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (1974) (rejecting the pure effects theory and advocating restraints
that either occur in the course oE foreign commerce or substantially affect either interstate

or foreign commerce). Cf.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§18(b) (1965) (substantial effect as a direct and foreseeable result of extraterritorial
conduct).
113. 549 F.2d at 611-12.
114. Id. at 613.
115. Id. at 614. In light of the test developed by the court, it determined that dismissal
of the action was improper and remanded the action to the district court. Id. at 615. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §40 (1965) (factors
STATES

similar to those enunciated by the Timberlane court). See note 102 supra.
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absent from the pure effects analysis."26 Thus, courts are no longer obligated
to assert jurisdiction" 17 if the foreign defendant's activities have a de minimis
effect in the United States."8
Reactions to the Timberlane decision have been mixed. It is applauded
by the Justice Department as a scholarly and masterful intermingling of substantive antitrust law and the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Law." 9 The Department sees Timberlane as neither
an extension of the effects doctrine nor an expansion of jurisdiction. 20 Rather,
the decision embodies a jurisdictional rule of reason in its recognition that
courts must weigh the potential harm to United States foreign relations if
2
the action is prosecuted.' '
The Canadian view of Timberlane can be characterized, at the least, as
apprehensive. One Canadian judge, and former member of the Canadian
Parliament, perceived Timberlane as thrusting
the American courts into the realm of diplomacy. I suppose everybody
else here is too polite to ask how it is that a judge of a Canadian court
or of an American court can decide what is the proper balance of international interests, for example, of Canada in the exploitation of its
natural resources and the interests of this country in the maintenance
of competition. I feel this is not a good area for the judiciary. 2 2
The Director General of the Bureau of Commercial and Commodity Relations in Ottawa, responding to the International Antitrust Guide and the
116. But see 549 F.2d at 612 (comity had been factored into the effects doctrine under
the guise of the word substantial).
117. This obligation would arise to offer an American citizen the protection of domestic
antitrust laws,'a domestic forum to assert his claim, to afford compensation and to deter
and punish the foreign offender.
118. For instance, in Case L of the Justice Department's International Antitrust Guide,
GumE, supra note 5, at 234, the Department declared its intention to include "all appropriate defendants" even though a foreign defendant corporation had no domestic business
activities. In such situations, the factors outlined under the third portion of Timberlane
could be decisive.

119. See Shenefield, supra note 17, at 22-23. The Justice Department views the opinion
as imposing on antitrust cases "a judicially objective standard of comity which recognizes the
unique considerations peculiar to foreign commerce enforcement." Id. at 22.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 22-23. This rule of reason is considered a vast improvement from the "direct
and/or substantial" standard. Id. at 23.
122. Blair, supra note 2, at 67. The example in the quoted portion of the text is a
reference to the current uranium litigation discussed at notes 126-185 and accompanying
text, infra.

Judge Blair also offered insight into the traditional views of comity, contrasting the
Canadian and English views with domestic application. "[T]he doctrine of comity is applied
in the domestic law of the United States to overcome conflicts between local jurisdictions. It
has resulted in a solution which might be called the balancing of interests. .
. But the
doctrine of comity, as it is traditionally known in international law, is quite a different
thing. It is a doctrine that says that states are obliged to recognize the laws of other states.
It has been applied in Canada, sometimes in very distasteful circumstances." Blair, supra
note 2, at 66.
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Timberlane decision, concluded similarly that it is not the court's function
to implement foreign policy.123 Rather, the role of the judiciary is to decide
and implement domestic law. Both the Canadian Director General and the
Attorney General of England and Wales are directly opposed to United
States' assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases. 124 They perceive the grant of jurisdiction and accompanying foreign discovery pro25
cedures as an invasion of the affected nation's sovereignty..
THE CURRENT SITUATION: Westinghouse LITIGATION

The current Westinghouse litigation illustrates the difficulties inherent in
domestic attempts to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction and discovery in both
Canada and the United Kingdom. 128 Westinghouse was unable to complete
shipment of uranium under the terms of its contracts with several public

123. See Stanford, supra note 2, at 205.
124. Id. See notes 172-185 and accompanying text, infra.
125. Silkin, The Perspective of the Attorney General of England and Wales, ABA SECTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST
AND OTHER LAWS 33 (J.P. Griffin ed. 1979); Stanford, supra note 2, at 202. See also notes
130-135, 172-185 and accompanying text, infra.
126. At least 27 separate actions are encompassed by the Westinghouse litigation. See
Note, supra note 27, at 324 n.4. Westinghouse contracted with several public utility
companies during the 1960's and early 1970's to provide them with uranium. The contract
price was fixed, subject only to escalation coinciding with the rate of inflation. See In Re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 275 (1977). Between 1973
and 1976 the price of uranium sky;rocketed from six dollars a pound to forty-one dollars per
pound. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation [1978 AC 547, 558
(Ga. 1977), rev'd sub nor In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. uranium contract litigation, No. 2
[19781 A.C. 571, (C.A. 1977), afl'd sub nor Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
[1978] A.C. 582 (H.L. 1978). Unable to fulfill the contracts, Westinghouse informed the
utilities that performance was commercially impracticable. Id. The utilities brought suit
against Westinghouse. Thirteen actions were consolidated in the Eastern District of Virginia,
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L.
1975). Three other utilities sued in a Pennsylvania state court; the latter action was subsequently settled. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d at
275-77 (1977). Three additional actions were brought in Sweden. See Note, supra note 35,
at 324, (citing Cheeseright, RTZ Stands in the Shade, Financial Times (London), Nov. 8,
1977, at 14, col. 3).
In connection with its defense of impracticability, Westinghouse charged the existence of
a world-wide cartel, beginning in 1972, to raise and fix the world market price of uranium.
See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA). No. 786 at A-3 and A-4 (Oct. 28, 1976). Additionally,
Westinghouse brought a treble damage action against twenty-nine domestic and foreign
corporations alleging a §1 Sherman Act violation. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480
F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). In order to obtain the documentary evidence needed to show
the existence of the cartel, Westinghouse issued letters of request to courts in England,
Canada, Australia, France and South Africa for use in its defense against the breach of
contract action. In each case its application was denied. See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 382, 654 (H.L. 1977).
Additionally, the Justice Department in 1976 confirmed an earlier report, see ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) No. 724 at A-1

(July 29, 1975), that it was conducting a criminal

investigation into the activities of the alleged international uranium cartel. Id. No. 772 at
A-1 (July 13, 1976), No. 773 at A-4 (July 20, 1976).
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utility companies. The companies sued Westinghouse for breach of contract.
Westinghouse defended on grounds of commercial impracticability resulting
from activities of an international cartel. Allegedly, the cartel had caused the
price of uranium to skyrocket nearly 700 percent. 2? To aid its defense of
commercial impracticability and its separate action against the alleged
cartelizers, Westinghouse needed documentary evidence supporting the
existence of the international cartel. Most of the information was located
abroad.12 8 In October of 1976, letters rogatory were sent to the High Courts
of Justice in England and Ontario.' 29 Both applications were denied.
CanadianPerspective

Canada refused to honor the letters rogatory because it perceived them
as an invasion of Canadian sovereignty, 30 an overbroad discovery practice
not sanctioned under Canadian law, 31 and an interference with express
public policy. 5 2 Specifically, the marketing arrangements had been approved
127. See note 126 supra.
128. See Note, supra note 27, at 824 n.6.
129. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation M.D.L. Docket
No. 235, [1978] A.C. 547, 557 (CA.), reed, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec,
Corp., [1978] A.C. 582 (H.L. 1977); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co.,
16 Ont. 2d at 257-76 (1977). The letters specified that the information was intended for
evidence at the trial and necessary for justice to be accomplished. In Re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation M.D.L. Docket No. 235, [1978] A.C. 547, 557 (C.A. 1977),
rev'd, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 582 (H.L. 1977). Thus,
the actual form of the letter complied with the recommendation of the United States' Delegate to the Special Commission on the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence. See notes 25
and 76 and text accompanying notes 71-76, supra. Rejecting the letters rogatory, Lord
Wilberforce observed: "Both letters rogatory were drafted by lawyers for Westinghouse...
after consultation with eminent counsel from England.... [T]he distinction ... between 'a
process by way of discovery and testimony for that purpose' and 'testimony for the trial itself' . . . is in fact not to be determined by the drafting of Westinghouse's lawyers but objectively by the nature of the testimony sought." Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Co., [1978] A.C. 582, 610 (H.L. 1977> (opinion of Lord Wilberforce). If the requested information is determined to infringe upon the receiving country's sovereignty, see text accompanying note 66 supra. no manner or form will be sufficient to obtain the material.
Other requests were made and denied in Australia, France, and South Africa. Australia
and South Africa have specific statutes prohibiting the disclosure of uranium information.
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act of 1976, Acrs. Ausr. P.; Atomic
Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, §80, 15 STAT. REpuB. So. AFR. 1045 (1977). Canada also has a
statute which forbids disclosure of any information related to the uranium cartel. Uranium
Information Security Regs., STAT. 0 & R 1977 (Can.).
180. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d at 291 (1977).
131. Id. at 286-88. The court's view was that the phraseology of the letters rogatory was
more or less contrived in an attempt to meet with the approval of the foreign tribunal. The
Canadian policy toward assisting a foreign court is that the help must be absolutely necessary
for the purpose of justice. The Canadian court concluded that the evidence Westinghouse
had requested was merely for discovery purposes and as such might neither be necessary nor
relevant to the action. Id. See note 14 supra.
132. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d at 291 (1977). In
September of 1976 the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources for Canada issued a press
release. The press release acknowledged that, as a result of oversupply and depressed prices
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and requested by the Canadian government.1 33 Further, Canadian Uranium
Security Regulations prohibiting disclosure of the requested information were
enacted to insulate Canadian nationals from foreign liability for acts which
complied with Canadian law.1 34 The Canadian court concluded that because

the Canadian government had clearly and forcefully prohibited disclosure of
national security uranium information, the refusal of the letters rogatory
accorded with international. comity3 5s
The Canadian's perceive the American balancing of interests approach as
inimical to traditionally expressed notions of international comity. 136 Under
the traditional view, nations have an obligation to recognize and defer to the
laws of other nations rather than weigh foreign policy consequences through
application of a balancing test.137 Therefore, a nation breaches international

comity when its requested discovery would violate the laws of the nation re138
quested to assist.
of uranium, compounded by the American closed market policies "the Canadian government initiated discussions with producing nations which led ultimately to an informal
marketing arrangement among non-U.S. producers. Canadian producers acted with the
approval and, in some cases, at the specific request of the federal government. The arrangements excluded the U.S. market." Id. at 280 (emphasis added). The cartel prices were below
American market prices; the sudden jump was explained by the 1973 oil crisis. Id. at 280-81.
In addition to the Minister's statement, the Uranium Information Security Regulations,
supra note 138, were a clear expiession of Canadian policy. In a press release by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, (Oct. 14, 1977), quoted in Blair, supra note 2, at 73-74,
the purpose for passing the Regulations was stated as: "to avoid placing the government in
the untenable position of allowing evidence to be provided for a foreign court for use in the
possible prosecution of Canadian nationals for acts that were in accordance with Canadian
law and government policy."
133. See note 132 supra.
134. See note 132 supra.
135. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d at 291 (1977).
See note 122 supra for a discussion of the doctrine of comity. The Court reasoned that if
the request was granted, Canadian public policy would be thwarted and its laws violated. See
notes 129 and 132 supra. Thus, comity would be breached if in assisting another tribunal
the Canadian court broke Canadian laws. The doctrine calls for recognition of the laws of
another nation; therefore the American court was obliged to recognize the Uranium Information Security Regulations. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co.,
16 Ont. 2d at 291.
136. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d at 291. See note
122 supra.
137. See note 122 supra.
138. See note 135 supra. Moreover, in the instant situation the United States court was
attempting to procure information which could ultimately be used to prosecute the foreign
cartelizers in the grand jury investigation. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne
Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d at 278, 289 (1977).
Even if the alleged cartel would have violated the American antitrust laws, it was in
accord with the laws of the foreign nations involved. See notes 129 and 132 supra. The
Court, therefore, had an additional reason to decline the letters of request. As the Canadian
justice noted, the enforcement of letters of request is discretionary, see note 25 supra; their
enforcement is based upon the doctrine of comity. The Court recognized that "[ijnherent in
the idea of international comity is a mutuality of purpose and of power." In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont at 290 (1977). Clearly, Canada and the
United States had different purposes in mind. Canada's laws were passed to protect its
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The Canadian contention, however, fails to recognize that one nation
need not defer application of its own laws merely to comply with those of
another nation.'39 Although Canada has asked for recognition of its Uranium
Security Law, this law directly conflicts with both domestic discovery rules
and antitrust policy. The law was specifically enacted to thwart domestic
attempts to obtain evidence in such lawsuits.40 Once jurisdiction has been
granted in domestic actions, deferral to the security legislation would merely
serve to frustrate the litigants' attempts to sustain their burden of proof.
Comity would be served at the expense of other important domestic goals.
Therefore, where nations' policies are so drastically opposed, a balancing of
their conflicting interests is not only appropriate, but necessary. 41
Under the facts of the Westinghouse- 2 antitrust action, the assertion of

jurisdiction43 and subsequent use of a grand jury to investigate the carte' 44
were an invasion of Canadian sovereignty. The Canadian government had
firmly advised the State Department that disclosure of uranium information
would be inimical to Canada's national security interest. 45 Yet, even after
recognizing Canada's position, the Westinghouse district court granted an
order requiring production of the foreign documents. 46 The district court,
ignoring Timberlane's characterization of the American view, declined to
citizens, see text accompanying note 17 supra, and the United States was attempting to prosecute Canadian nationals for activity that was in complete accord with Canadian law and
policy. See note 132 supra. Even if the court had concluded that the requested information
was not for purposes of discovery, the letters rogatory would not have been enforced. In re
Westinghouse Elec. Co. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d at 290 (1977). See notes 132-135
and accompanying text, supra.
139. If international comity involves mutuality of purpose, see note 138 supra, which
was not present in the instant case, then the United States need not have deferred to
Canadian law disclosure prohibitions when making its discovery order. Accord, In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1166 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
140. See note 141 infra.
141. See text accompanying note 155 infra.
142. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273 (1977). See
notes 126-138 supra.
143. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill.
1979). See also
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Adams, 570 F.2d 899 (1978); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio
Algom Ltd., No. 96 C 3830, N.D. Ill. (Nov. 15, 1976), reported in ANTTRUSr & TADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 786, at A-3 to A-4 (Oct. 28, 1976).
144. See AuriRusr & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 772, at A-10 (July 13, 1976), No. 773
at A-4 (July 20, 1976). See also note 135 supra.
145. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. IM. 1979).
146. Id. at 1156. There was some dispute as to whether the documents were under the
control of defendants and whether the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
In all but one case the district court concluded that defendants, United States corporations,
not their foreign parent corporations which had possession, had control. Id. at 1151-64. Additionally, the court determined that all defendants were within the court's jurisdiction
with the possible exception of Noranda Mines Ltd., a Canadian foreign parent company
with both foreign and domestic subsidiaries. As to Noranda, the court ruled that it:
"possess[ed] jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction over the parties. In the exercise of that
jurisdiction, we may compel discovery to aid our resolution of the personal jurisdiction
issues." Id. at 1151. Noranda's contention that the discovery be limited to the question of
jurisdiction was refused and full production of all documents was ordered.
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balance Canada's national security, as evidenced by its nondisclosure laws
against the strong domestic policy of vigorous antitrust enforcement. 147 Rather,
the court concluded that, as the judiciary has negligible expertise in foreign
economic and social policy, it is incapable of balancing such completely
contradictory positions. Therefore, the court deferred to domestic antitrust
148
policy.
If the court had applied the Timberlane balancing test,149 the domestic
effect and cognizable injury factors would have been satisfied. 1 50 The third
step, the significance of American interests vis-A-vis Canada's, would have presented considerable difficulty. Timberlane's elemental analysis of this third
step' 5' requires an initial consideration of the degree of conflict between
the nations. United States policy of vigorous antitrust enforcement was in
direct conflict with the Canadian policy of protecting citizens and its national
security interest in uranium. The Canadian nondisclosure law was enacted
to prevent disclosure of uranium information in lawsuits involving Canadian
nationals. 5 2 Second, Timberlane requires consideration of the nationality
of the parties. In Westinghouse, the chief Canadian defendant, Noranda, was
a Canadian corporation with foreign and domestic subsidiaries.' 53 Its principal
place of business was in Canada.14 Next, the parties allegiance must be taken
into account. As a defendant in the treble damage action, Noranda allied
itself with Canada. This allegiance was, at least in part, attributable to the
protection that Canadian law offered Noranda from forced disclosure of
potentially damaging information." 5 5 The fourth element, the extent of expected compliance, weighs in favor of Canada's interest. In light of Canada's
firm stance, Noranda was unable to produce all of the requested information;
additionally, it was uncertain whether any information would become avail56
able.
Consideration of the fifth factor, the relative significance of effects, did not
find the United States' economy damaged to a significantly greater degree
than Canada's as the domestic increase in uranium prices was not an isolated
147. Id. at 1148. Instead, the district court deferred to the strong domestic policy
enunciated throughout domestic case law. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Ass'n, Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("The antitrust laws are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms"); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903
(2d Cir. 1968) ("These laws have long been the cornerstone of this nation's economic policies,
have been vigorously enforced and the subject of frequent interpretation by our Supreme
Court').
148. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. II. 1979).
149. See text accompanying notes 114 and 115 supra.
150. The uranium price jump of 700% and Westinghouse's inability to fulfill its
contracts, see note 135 supra, would have satisfied the first two factors.
151. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
152. See notes 132-133, 138 and accompanying text, supra; text accompanying note 145
supra.
153. See note 146 supra.
154. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
155. Id. at 1150-51.
156. Id. at 1155-56. See notes 130-135 and accompanying text, supra; note 164 infra.
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phenomenon. Canada contended that the 1973 oil crisis, not the marketing
arrangement, caused the dramatic price rise. Canada ceased fixing the price
of uranium in 1975; yet the price continued to rise. 5 7 Moreover, the Canadian
Foreign Minister disputed the cartel's 58 effects saying in an official statement
that, the agreement was calculated to exclude the U.S. market from the
cartel's clientele. 59 Therefore, the intent to harm the domestic economy and
the foreseeability of the effect, the sixth and seventh Timberlane factors,

were apparently lacking.
Finally, the violations, if proven, would be of great significance in the
United States. Price fixing has long been considered a per se offense under
domestic antitrust laws. 60 This is directly contrary to the Canadian position
under the Westinghouse facts. The Canadian government expressly en-

couraged, and occasionally required, the pricing activity.' 0 '
It is apparent in this conflict that both the United States and Canada
have considerable interests at stake. Canada's specified promulgation of
national security regulations prohibiting the disclosure of uranium information8 2 tips the scales slightly in its favor. The Canadian regulations were

purposefully enacted to ensure that foreign courts could not require production
of evidence relating to the uranium marketing arrangement.' s An order for
production of documents, therefore, was unlikely to be persuasive in Canada6 4
In view of the Canadian court's refusal to honor the Westinghouse letters
rogatory, future letters of request will likely serve only to further antagonize

the Canadian judiciary. 6 5 Therefore, the assertion of jurisdiction and the
production of documents order have probably damaged Canadian-United
States foreign relations far more than they have benefited Westinghouse in
its antitrust action.
157. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1188, 1155-56 (M.D. IM. 1979).
See also note 135 supra.
158. See note 182 supra.
159. Id.
160. See United States v. Trenton Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
161. See notes 182-133 and accompanying text, supra.
162. See notes 129 and 132 supra. See also text accompanying note 134 supra.
168. See note 132 supra.
164. See text accompanying note 129 supra. Accord, In re Westinghouse Elec. Uranium
Contract Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977). In conjunction with one civil action
against Westinghouse for breach of contract, see note 135 supra, Westinghouse caused a subpoena for production of documents to be issued to Rio Algom Corp. Rio Algom, a Canadian
corporation with a subsidiary in Utah objected to the order based on the Canadian nondisclosure laws. A Utah district court ordered Rio Algom to pay a $10,000 a day fine for
noncompliance. 563 F.2d at 994. Finding the Canadian Uranium Security Regulations a
complete defense to the production order, the Tenth Circuit reversed. Id. at 1003.
For. additional developments relating to the uranium cartel see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf
Canada Ltd., discussed in A =rrausr & TRADE RFG. REFP (BNA) No. 957, at A-9 to A-10 (Mar.
7, 1980). The Canadian Supreme Court refused to enforce letters rogatory applied for by
Gulf Oil Corp. for documents held by two of its Canadian subsidiaries. Although the subsidiaries expressed a willingness to assist their American parent, they were precluded from
doing so by the Canadian nondisclosure laws. Id.
165. Id. See notes 129-180 supra.
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British Perspective of Westinghouse
Although the circumstances surrounding the British Westinghouse proceeding, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,166 differ from those
in Canada, the end result was virtually indistinguishable: the letters rogatory
were not enforced.'6 z The English action involved a suit by public utilities
against Westinghouse. Westinghouse, in support of its commercial
impracticability defense, alleged the existence of an international cartel created
to raise the price of uranium. 63 The English and Canadian proceedings
differed in that English corporate witnesses were afforded a statutory privilege
against self-incrimination. 69 Further, as the proceeding which prompted the
request for information was within United States jurisdiction, individual
witnesses were entitled to invoke the fifth amendment. 170 Therefore, production
of evidence under the letters of request was effectively precluded by the
7
combined privileges.1 '
166. [19781 A.C. 582 (H.L. 1977).
167. Id. at 478.
168. See note 126 supra.
169. [1978] A.C. 582 at 612-15, 635-39, 645-48, 654. But see opinions of Viscount Dilhorne
and Lord Fraser of Tulleybelton which declare that they would not have given effect to the
letters rogatory because the request was overbroad, amounting to a mere "fishing expedition."
Id. at 622, 650.
170. See id. at 612-15. See also Note, supra note 27, at 334-41. Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty of Rome (relating to restrictive trade practices), [1957] 28 U.N.T.S. 11, have the
force of law in Great Britain. The antitrust provisions of the European Economic Community, EEC, which is bound by the Treaty, apply only to corporations. For a comparison
with United States law see U.S. CONST. amend. V (privilege against self-incrimination applies
to individuals only). The codified English common law principle against self-incrimination,
CIVIL EVIDENCE AcT, c.64, 1968, allows one to refuse production of evidence which could be
used to expose him to a civil or criminal penalty under English law. Therefore, had the
corporations been required to produce evidence concerning the uranium marketing arrangements, they would have been exposed to a potential penalty for violation of articles 85 and 86.
Thus, the corporations were permitted to claim the privilege.
171. See [1978] A.C. at 612-16. The ruling granting the witnesses the fifth amendment
privilege was made by the judge for the utilities' Virginia proceedings, see note 135 supra,
sitting in the American Embassy in London. Thereafter, the situation became complex. Displeased with the ruling granting privilege to the individual witnesses, the United States
Justice Department applied to the domestic judge for an order to compel testimony pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §§6002-6003 (1970), which would grant the witnesses immunity from prosecution.
[1978] A.C. at 613. The application was accomplished by a letter from the United States
Attorney General expressing the urgent need for the individuals' testimony. The letter stated
that because the individual witnesses were outside domestic jurisdiction, the Department of
Justice doubted testimony could be obtained through any British-American cooperation.
Moreover, the testimony was deemed indispensible to the grand jury investigation. Letter
from Attorney General of the United States to Judge Merhige (July 12, 1977), reprinted in
part in [1978] A.C. at 614-15. Just two and one half weeks earlier, the State Department
had received an aid-memoire from the English government requesting that the Justice Department not intervene in the civil case in order to obtain evidence for the grand jury's
criminal antitrust investigation. Id. at 629.
The House of Lords did not consider any withdrawal of the fifth amendment privilege
relevant to their decision to deny the letters rogatory. Id. at 615. Obtaining evidence for use
in grand jury proceedings did not fall within the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, see notes 25, 75-81 supra. The English
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The House of Lords took judicial notice of Her Majesty's express policy
against United States' assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust
actions. 172 The Westinghouse litigation was considered sufficiently important
for the Attorney General of England to intervene in protest to the enforcement of the letters rogatory. The English Attorney General contended that
the alleged cartel's activities were not universally deemed unlawful. 7 3 Moreover, the United States court's attempt to assert jurisdiction amounted to an
extension of an economic policy in ostensible conflict with policies of other
nations.1 4 The domestic economic goal of encouraging vigorous and unfettered
competition collided with the English government's attempts to protect its
nationals from the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws.
The American procedures, therefore, threatened English sovereignty. 75
The English Attorney General further argued that American application
of the effects doctrine is inherently unworkable in the field of international
affairs. He contended that almost any limitation on competition by parties
outside American borders will have consequences within the United States.'70
Therefore, foreign corporations would have to constantly guard against violations of American antitrust laws. Moreover, the penal character of the laws,
particularly the treble damage provision, 77 is offensive to English policy.78
The Hague Conventions I' 79 and II1 s o aid service of process and discovery
by a signatory nation only in civil proceedings. The treble damage aspect of
an American antitrust suit is considered indistinguishable from a criminal
sanction. Therefore, the monetary penalty does not comport with British
notions of a truly civil action as contemplated by the Hague Conventions.181
Similarly, if the letters of request had been granted, the information would
have become available for use in the Westinghouse antitrust proceedings s 2 as
well as the United States' grand jury proceedings. 183 Because a grand jury instatute which implemented the Hague Convention II, see note 25 supra, Evidence (Proceeding in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c.34, did extend to criminal proceedings, thus going
beyond the scope required by the Convention. However, the statute required that the
criminal proceedings be instituted. Since the grand jury proceedings could only lead to
criminal action, it fell outside the scope of the English Act. See [1978] A.C. at 615.
172. Id. at 615-16, 639-40. Lord Diplock stated: "Her Majesty's government regards as an
unacceptable invasion of its own sovereignty the use of United States courts by the United
States government as a means to investigate activities outside the United States of British
companies and individuals who it claims infringe the antitrust laws of the United States."
Id. at 639.
173. Id. Transcript of the Attorney General's argument before the House of Lords,
reprintedin [1978] A.C. 589-595.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

[1978] A.C. at 594.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 594.
See notes 12-13 supra.
See Transcript of the Attorney General's argument before the House of Lords,
reprinted in [1978] A.C. at 594.
179. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text, supra.
180. See notes 25, 71-81 and accompanying text, supra.
181. See note 171 supra.
182. See note 126 supra.
183. See note 171 supra.
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vestigation is not a civil proceeding within the Hague Convention II, English
discovery information could not be obtained for it. s4 The final reason for
denial of the letters rogatory was aptly summarized by Lord Wilberforce, who
stated: "It is axiomatic that in antitrust matters the policy of one state
may be to defend what it is the policy of another state to attack.' 8 5
British and CanadianResponses to Westinghouse
Britain's most recent and decisive response to the Westinghouse proceedings, and to United States assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in general,
is the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980.186 This new legislation
frustrates the assertion of jurisdiction and attempted discovery in treble
damage actions. On July 11, 1980, the Canadian Parliament introduced a bill
modeled after the British statute.1 7 Both the Canadian bill and the British
Act protect international commerce and national business interests against
88
American enforcement of its antitrust laws.
The British legislation permits the government to block requests for
documents within the United Kingdom's jurisdiction for use in antitrust proceedings 8 9 or investigations;1 0 in the United States.' 8 ' A person carrying on
business in Great Britain, if requested 8 2 to produce information concerning
acts outside the requesting country's jurisdiction, may be required to give
notice to the Secretary of State. 93 If the Secretary determines that the request
threatens Great Britain's trading interests, 9 4 infringes on its jurisdiction, or
prejudices its sovereignty 95 or security,196 he may prohibit compliance with

184. Id.
185. [1978] A.C. at 616. For an excellent discussion of
litigation see Note, supra note 27. For the reaction of the
to the Westinghouse case see Silken, supra note 125, at 28-34.
186. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 (Eliz. II)
printed in ANTITRusr & TRADIE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 959, F-1
infra. The preface of the Act states as its purpose: "To Protect

the intricacies of the English
Attorney General of England
[hereinafter cited as Act], re-

to F-2 (Apr. 10, 1980), app. 3,
British Interests From Foreign

Antitrust Judgments." Id. at F-l, app. 3, infra. See also ANTITRUSr & TRADE

EG. REP. (BNA)

No. 959 at A-5 (Apr. 10, 1980).
187. See ANITRUST & TRADE "REG. Rnp. (BNA) No. 979, at A-19 to A-20, 973 at A-5 to
A-6 (Aug. 28, 1980), for a discussion of the proposed Canadian statute, bill C-41.
188. See ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 959, at A-5, 979 at A-5 (Apr. 10, 1980).
189. Act, supra note 186, §2(1)(a) & (b).
190. Id. §2(3)(b).
191. The Act is not limited to United States antitrust suits, but the provisions dealing
with multiple damages actions lend a strong inference to that purpose. See id. §§5(2) & (6).
The scope of the statute is apparently limited to that which effects, or may effect, the
trading interests of the United Kingdom. Id. §1(1).
192. For purposes of the Act, a request is synonymous with a requirement. Id. §2(5).

193. Id. §§l(l)(b), 1(2) & 2(l).
194. Id. §I(1).
195. Id. §2(2)(a).
196. Id. §2(2)(b). Additionally, this section would permit the Secretary to order noncompliance with the foreign order if compliance has the potential to damage the foreign
relations of Great Britain with any other country.
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the foreign order.197 Failure to inform the Secretary of State or to comply
with an order issued by him subjects a person to a 11000 fine. 98 Similarly, the
Canadian bill empowers the Attorney General to restrict or prohibit disclosure
of information to a foreign court if disclosure would adversely affect significant
200
business interests.19 9 Violators may incur five year prison terms or $5000 fines.
The British Act also provides that if a multiple damage judgment or claim
for contribution 0- is awarded, a qualifying defendant will be able to recapture
202
the amount which exceeds the portion attributable to actual compensation.
A qualifying defendant is defined as a citizen or corporation of the United
Kingdom or a person carrying on business within the United Kingdom. 203
Thus, if a treble damage judgment was awarded by an American court against
a British corporation for acts occurring outside United States territory, twothirds of the award would be recoverable by the British defendant from the
plaintiff. Even if the American plaintiff could execute on only a portion of
the judgment, two thirds of that portion would be recoverable by the qualifying defendant. 204 The analogous Canadian bill empowers the Attorney General
to either declare a foreign judgment unenforceable or to permit enforcement
of a reduced monetary award. 20 5 The bill permits a Canadian defendant, not
ordinarily a resident of the enforcing country, to recoup any excessive amount
20 6
awarded in the foreign antitrust judgment.
The British Act provides that if another nation will enforce a British
judgment to recover excess damages, similar judgments made in that country
will be enforced in the United Kingdom. 20 7 This provision serves as an in197. -4d. §§1(3) & 2(1). The prohibition may be either specifically related to a certain
portion of the request or general, forbidding compliance with the entire order. Id. §1(5).
198. 1d. §. A person or corporation not a citizen of the United Kingdom will not be
subject to any penalty for contravention of the statute by actions performed outside Great
Britain. 1d. §3(2). A citizen or corporation of the United Kingdom would be subject to the
fine if they have a "reasonable excuse for failure to observe the statute." Id. §3(1).
199. See ANTuRuSr & TRADE Ra. Rm. (BNA) No. 979, at A-5 (Aug. 28, 1980).
200. Id.
201. Presently, there is no contribution among antitrust defendants in the United States;
however, commentators have advocated contribution. See, e.g., Jacobson, ContributionAmong
Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary Solution to a Recurring Problem, 32 U. FLA. L. Ray. 217
passim (1980).

202. Act, supra note 186, §§5(2), 5(4), 6(1) & 6(2).
203. Id. §6(1)(a)-(c). Additionally, the judgment must have been paid. Id. Recovery
cannot be had if either the defendant is ordinarily a resident of the country which awarded
the judgment or a corporation which had its principle place of business in that country at
the time of the award. Id. §6(3). Additionally, the defendant would not be able to recover if
he carried out business in the awarding country and the proceedings therein concerned
"activities exclusively carried on in that country." Id. §6(4). A British court will entertain
recovery proceedings even if "the person against whom the proceedings are brought is not
within the jurisdiction of the court." Id. §6(5). Apparently the British protest of assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction utilized in the United States has given rise to a similar process
in England: lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the recovery action.
204.

See id. §6(6).

205. See ANrrrmusT &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 979, at A-6 (1980).
206. Id.
207. Act, supra note 186, §7.
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centive to other nations to enact similar legislation. The following example
illustrates the provision's effect. In an American antitrust suit, domestic
plaintiff, D, has been awarded $3,000,000 in treble damages against a corporation of country C. If country C enacts a reciprocal statute, even if D has no
assets in C, but has British assets, the British courts will allow defendant to
recover $2,000,000. This provision may motivate nations which object to the
punitive nature of treble damages or extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction
in antitrust actions, to enact reciprocal legislation.
Presently, it is uncertain whether the Canadian bill, if enacted, will
include either the reciprocal or recapture provisions.2 0 8 Recently, however,
other nations have threatened to follow Great Britain's lead. The Australian
government is considering enactment of reciprocal recapture legislation to
effect seizure of WVestinghouse's assets if it succeeds in domestic litigation against
four Australian uranium companies.2 0 9 Moreover, forty-one British Commonwealth nations adopted a nonbinding resolution in May of 1980 which
contained a provision encouraging member nations to enact legislation per2 0
mitting recovery of treble damage awards. 1

POSSIBLE UNITED STATES RESPONSES

The new British legislation and the proposed Canadian bill are thorough
responses to domestic assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments.211 Discovery of foreign materials is also thwarted.212 While
2 13
it
the United States has yet to respond officially to these blocking statutes,
may employ one of several alternative approaches in dealing with the statutes'

effects. None is particularly satisfying in light of the express domestic policy
of vigorous antitrust enforcement.2 14 However, the comprehensive nature of
the new and proposed foreign legislation precludes a more gratifying solution.
The first alternative is to continue assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in antitrust suits, while allowing plaintiffs to protect their foreign assets by
opting to sue for compensatory damages only. If treble damages are awarded,
these assets could be seized under the Protection of Trading Interests Act of
1980 or reciprocal legislation. Such a solution would require legislative action
as it contravenes the Clayton Act's automatic treble provision. 215 It would,
208.

A text of the proposed statute has not yet been made available, however, the

Bureau of National Affairs has issued an analysis of the bill. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 979, at A-5 to A-6 (Aug. 28, 1980).
209. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 980, at A-13 (Sept. 11, 1980). The
action involving Australian defendants is In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp.
1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979), see notes 126, 129, 142-148 and accompanying text, supra. Presently
Australia has a statute that empowers the attorney general to declare antitrust judgments

rendered outside of Australia unenforceable. Foreign Antitrust Judgments Restrictions of
Enforcement Act of 1979, AcTs AUSTL. P.
210. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 963, at A-10 to A-1 (May 8, 1980).
211. See text accompanying notes 186-203 supra.
212. See text accompanying notes 191-200 supra.
213. ANTITRusT TRADE & REC. REP. (BNA) No. 963, at A-11 (May 8, 1980).
214. See notes 4, 5, 12, 42, 147 and accompanying text, supra.
215. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976). See note 12 and accompanying text, supra.
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however, offer several advantages. By continuing to assert jurisdiction under
the present domestic effects doctrine 2 1 the United States would avoid submitting entirely to the foreign law, despite revision of recoverable Clayton
Act damages. Although limiting the award to compensatory damages will only
partially placate the objecting nations,217 it may lessen the potential damage
to American international relations. As all countries adopting such legislation
will have firm positions opposing domestic policy, a compromise is the only
possible solution. Moreover, this alternative allows the domestic plaintiff to
218
recover his actual damages without jeopardizing his foreign assets.
This option, however, is deficient in several respects. The disparate treatment of foreign defendants in domestic antitrust actions will encourage other
nations to adopt reciprocal statutes. In light of the British reciprocity provision, this is the consequence most likely to flow from such a United States
position.219 Although such a solution would probably improve relations with
Great Britain and other nations, the United States is unlikely to adopt this
alternative. The proposal contravenes domestic policies encouraging competition and antitrust enforcement. 220 A basic feature of domestic antitrust law
is the treble damage provision 22 3 which facilitates compensation of injured
parties, deters future violations, and punishes the violators.222 This proposal
could be construed as allowing foreign nations to dictate domestic policy,
arguably an invasion of United States' sovereignty, in breach of international
22 3
comity.
A second and more acceptable solution is to develop either binational or
multinational consultation procedures with Britain, Canada and other nations

216. See notes 42-45, 111-118 and accompanying text, supra.
217. Domestic assertion of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction would continue to
irritate Great Britain, Canada and other nations. See notes 4, 7, 46, 47, 53, 176-178 and accompanying text, supra. However, the effects doctrine is deeply embedded in domestic law
and it is unlikely that after over three decades of case law application and its adoption by
the Restatement, that the United States would discard it. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATONs LAW

218.

rOF
TH

UNrrED STATEs §18 (1965); notes 107-111 supra.

See text accompanying notes 201-210 supra.

219. However, in light of the threatened Canadian and Australian statutes, see notes

137, 209 and accompanying text, supra, it is clear that the United States must take action
to ensure that the potential legislation does not come into existence.
220. See notes 4, 5, 12, 42, 147 and accompanying text, supra.
221. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976). See notes 12 and accompanying text, supra.
222. See notes 12, 13 and accompanying text, supra. Additionally, the treble damage
provision was enacted to encourage private citizens to help supplement government enforcement by providing them with meaningful compensation. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 n.10 (1977); 21 CONG. RPc. 1767-68, 2612, 3146-50 (1980).
See also Note, Closing the Door on Consumer Antitrust Standing, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 237, 24952 (1979).
223. For a discussion of international comity, see note 122 supra. Although the doctrine
of international comity calls for recognition of the laws of other nations, it is not meant to
mandate that a nation with a conflicting law ignore its own law and apply another country's.
See notes 138-139 supra. However, if plaintiffs are given the option of suing for treble or
compensatory damages, then domestic policy will be intact in the majority of cases in which
the foreign blocking statutes would not apply.
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in an effort to effect a compromise.224 The procedures of the Basford-Mitchell
arrangement 225 have proven inadequate. Although presently a workable
diplomatic solution has not been advanced, one must be developed in the
near future.
Currently, experts from the United States and Great Britain are drafting
a series of recommendations designed to ease British tension regarding domestic
extraterritorial antitrust application.226 One proposal offered is to require
domestic federal courts to notify the State Department of private actions; the
Department would then acquire information necessary to determine whether
jurisdiction would be pro]?er. 22 7 This suggestion should please Canadian
interests because it substitutes an initial judicial finding of jurisdiction with
an executive determination.228
Great Britain's new legislation, and Canada's proposed statute, have
placed the foreign assets of domestic plaintiffs in jeopardy.229 The victorious

American plaintiff could eventually emerge a loser if valuable foreign property
is seized to recover the punitive amount of the award.23 0 Therefore, the United
States has a strong incentive to initiate negotiations.23 1 In view of the forceful

British and Canadian protests concerning attempts to extraterritorially enforce
antitrust laws, perhaps the Justice Department and domestic courts should reevaluate the policy of "exercis[ing] the fullest permissible jurisdiction"23 2
in antitrust actions in deference to international comity and recognition of
foreign sovereignty. At a minimum, domestic courts should give considerable
weight to considerations of comity as expressed in the Timberlane analysis.233
Otherwise, the United States will thwart its own laws by ultimately encourag23
ing other nations to enact retaliatory legislation. 4
Once domestic jurisdiction has been granted, the United States must
continue to assist litigants' attempts to discover foreign documents or information on activities occurring outside American borders. Presently, domestic
antitrust laws provide civil plaintiffs with a right of action for injuries if
there is a direct and foreseeable domestic effect, even if the violations occurred
beyond United States' borders. 2. 5 At the worst, domestic courts will be unable
224. Negotiations are already underway between the United States and Australia in
an attempt to reach a bilateral agreement on antitrust enforcement policy conflicts. See
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 977 at A-10 (Aug. 14, 1980). However, there is no
indication as to how soon an agreement might be reached.
225. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 969 at A-6 to A-7 (June 19, 1980).
226. Id. at A-7. One suggestion offered is to require the federal courts to notify the
State Department of private actions; the Department would then acquire information to
determine if jurisdiction would be proper.
227. Id.
228. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text, supra.
229. See notes 201-210 and accompanying text, supra.
230. E.g., Act, supra note 193, § §5(2), 5(4), 6(1), 6(2).
231. Moreover, the United States should encourage the negotiations which have already
begun. See note 224 supra.
232. GUIE, supra note 5, at 8.
234. See text accompanying notes 208-210 supra.
235. See notes 2, 5-6, 12, 17, 43-44, 100-102, 106, 114-121 and accompanying text, supra.
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to procure the information.2" The potential fine facing a qualifying defendant
under the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 is only £1000.27 Com-

pared to the amount of a potential award, this penalty is negligible. Thus, the
statute serves more as an expression of the United Kingdom's antagonistic
policy than a harsh penalty. Its greatest value is to non-party witnesses who
could not otherwise be compelled to comply with a domestic order for production. This was the situation of the British domestics in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp.
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.23 The statute provides authority for the
United Kingdom's express policy against enforcing letters of request in
2 9
similar contexts. 8
Although the Canadian bill would provide a $5000 fine or up to five years
imprisonment for violation of the Attorney General's nondisclosure order,240
.domestic discovery attempts should be sought nonetheless. The monetary
penalty is sufficiently insignificant so as to resemble a policy statement. The
threat of imprisonment, however, is too harsh a sanction to disregard in forcing
compliance with a domestic discovery order. A Canadian defendant should
be required to make a good faith effort to comply with a domestic order;
that effort should include an attempt to be excused from the provisions of

the bill.241
If the domestic order is directed to a party over which the court has
jurisdiction, it may still request production of documents which are protected under British or Canadian laws. 242 Although no court desires to
compel a party to violate the laws of another nation, and, in turn, violate
international comity,2 43 each defendant must be made aware of the conflicting
requirements placed upon him by opposing national policies. In other
words, each defendant "must confront . . . the need to 'surrender to one
sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom' or, alternatively, a
willingness to accept the consequences." 2"
United States law does not recognize a party's conflicting legal obligations
236. The district court in Westinghouse's antitrust action, In re Uranium Antitrust

Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. IlL. 1979), see 126, 134-162 and accompanying text, supra,
recognized this potential inability to comply with a domestic discovery law. However, an
order was issued to foreign defendants. See notes 146-165 and accompanying text, supra. The
district judge stated: "Even if some defendants subsequently conclude .. . that they have
already done everything within their power to comply with such an order, we do not
think an order at this time would be a futile gesture." 480 F. Supp. at 1156.
237. Act, supra note 186, §3.
288. [1978] A.C. 582 (H.L. 1977), discussed at notes 166-185 and accompanying text, supra.
239. See text accompanying notes 189-198 supra.
240. See notes 199-200 and accompanying text, supra.
241. Cf. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,
200-01 (1958) (plaintiff successfully persuaded Swiss government to release a portion of
records protected by Swiss nondisclosure law). See note 102 supra.
242. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF FOPEGN RELATIONs LAws OF THE UNrED STATES
§§39-40 (1965), discussed at note 102 supra.

243. See notes 122, 186-139 and accompanying text, supra.
244. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 905 (1968) (quoting First Nat'l
City Bank of New York v. Internal Revenue Serv., 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 948 (1960)).
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as conclusive grounds for declining to order conduct proscribed by other
nation's laws. 215 The mandate of Timberlane is to balance domestic interests

against those of the foreign nation.2 46 This analysis takes into account a
sufficiently broad spectrum of factors to ensure a fair resolution. If the domestic
and foreign interests appear balanced, a discovery order should be issued even if
it conflicts with the interests of a foreign nation. If the defendant, however,
fails to adhere to the order, diligence and good faith should be considered in
determining whether to impose sanctions.2 4 7 If, after exhausting all avenues,
the defendant determines that he is unable to comply with the discovery
order, at least an attempt will have been made. Domestic courts could not
require more without breaching international comity by compelling a viola2
tion of foreign law. 4

8

CONCLUSION

United States' assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust actions
have generated problems whose resolution is uncertain. Three years ago the
Associate Attorney General of the United States recognized "that 'unyielding'
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws 'could provoke damaging
retaliation' which would impair the ability of the Department of Justice 'to
obtain effective relief as to foreign conspiracies involving foreign products.' "249
With the advent of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, the proposed
Canadian legislation and the threatened blocking statutes of other nations, 250
this prognosis has become a reality. It is the United States' responsibility to
deter other nations from enacting similar legislation and to minimize the
damage to domestic antitrust efforts in Great Britain and Canada. As long
as potential American antitrust liability encourages noncompliance with
foreign policies and laws, nations may feel obliged to protect their nationals
by enacting blocking legislation. 251 The United States must therefore attempt
to relax the pressures which prompt such legislation.
The United States must recognize that fundamental differences regarding
international comity, not mere disparities in antitrust law and procedures,
are at the heart of the current dispute.2 52 As the dispute is laden with sub245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §§39-40
(1969). But see Societe Internationale Pour Participants Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,
211 (1958) (recognizing that "fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for
nonproduction").
246. See notes 117-125 and accompanying text, supra.
247. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,
213 (1958).
248. See, In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
249. Address by Michael Egan, Assoc. U.S. Attorney General, before the Business Law
Section, Int'l Barr Ass'n 7-8 (Nov. 3, 1977), quoted in Stanford, supra note 2, at 208.
250. See notes 186-210 and accompanying text, supra.
251. See Stanford, supra note 2, at 206. See also notes 208-210 and accompanying text,
supra.
252. See Stanford, supra note 2, at 212-14; Transcript of the Attorney General's argument
before the House of Lords, reprinted in [1978] A.C. 589, 594. See also text accompanying
notes 173-174 supra.
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stantial foreign policy considerations, the executive branch, not the judidary,

is best equipped to assess the consequences of challenged policy.2 53 Moreover,
the increasingly transnational character of individual and corporate business

activities requires consultation and cooperation between governments in
dealing with restrictive trade practices. Unilateral efforts are insufficient. The
United States must continue to emphasize consultation procedures with
Canada and Great Britain. Compromise is inevitable if nations hope to

function effectively in an age of multinational corporations.
GEoRGIA JAcoBsoN NEWMAN

253. See text accompanying notes 122-124 & 148, supra. Some guidance is provided in the
RSTATEsmENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELAnONS LAw OF TnE UNrED STATES (1965) and in the
briefs and arguments of the lawyers in the case. Although the former may provide some
guidance, each suit entails differing considerations of application of the Restatement's
principles. Contributions made by the lawyers are often strained in order to uphold their
clients' case. The executive branch of the government is more adept in dealing with problems
concerning foreign relations than the judiciary. Perhaps the Department of Justice should
promulgate guidelines for the judiciary to use in complex antitrust litigation which involves

foreign nations. See also note 231 supra (another recent proposal aimed at lessening the
judiciary's role).
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